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Abstract
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems are widely used in the management of critical
infrastructure such as electricity and water distrubu-
tion systems. Currently there is little understanding
of how to best protect SCADA systems from mali-
cious attacks. We review the constraints and require-
ments for SCADA security and propose a suitable
architecture (SKMA) for secure SCADA communi-
cations. The architecture includes a proposed key
management protocol (SKMP). We compare the ar-
chitecture with a previous proposal from Sandia Labs.
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1 Introduction
Nations are becoming increasingly dependent on
automated Supervisory Control And Data Acquisi-
tion (SCADA) systems to help deliver critical services
such as water, sewerage and electricity distribution.
SCADA systems, which once used proprietary com-
munication mechanisms, are increasingly using stan-
dard protocols, such as DNP3 (Curtis 2005).
The use of standard protocols, combined with in-
creased interconnectivity with other networks, has
changed the threat environment. In 2001 the British
Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT) began
recording information about world-wide industrial se-
curity incidents (Byres & Lowe 2004), storing this
information in a database, similar to the CERT com-
puter security incident database. CERT began cap-
turing computer security incident data in 1988, and
has seen the number of incidents rise from six in
1988 to 137,529 in 2003 (CERT/CC Statistics 1988-
2005 2005). While the current rate of incidents being
added to the BCIT database is currently low, it is
also increasing. The increase in incidents reported,
and the changing nature of the sources, indicate that
the risk of SCADA incidents occurring is increasing.
The need to secure SCADA systems has there-
fore been identified as an important field of research.
One critical security requirement for SCADA systems
is that communication channels need to be secured.
Secure keys need to be established before crypto-
graphic techniques can be used to secure communi-
cations.
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1.1 Relationship to Existing Work
Communications security for SCADA is a topic that
is being addressed in both the academic community
and in industry. Wang & Chu (2004) have developed
broadcast and point-to-point protocols, based on ear-
lier work in Sensor Networks (Perrig, Szewczyk, Ty-
gar, Wen & Culler 2002). In industry, the American
Gas Association is developing a standard for secure
communication (AGA 12-1 Working Group 2005)
that is based on link-level encryption. Although these
protocols use cryptographic techniques to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of data, they do not di-
rectly address key establishment.
Cryptographic protocols depend on having secure
keys distributed to the parties participating in the
protocol. A cryptographic key needs to be established
before messages can be encrypted and sent between
parties.
Researchers at Sandia have produced a paper
on key establishment for SCADA (SKE) (Beaver,
Gallup, Neumann & Torgerson 2002). Their paper
firstly outlines SCADA security systems architecture,
and then discusses a key management solution. How-
ever the key management design that Beaver et al
have proposed, has the following limitations:
1. Both symmetric and public key cryptography
techniques are used.
2. Long term keys are shared between nodes via
manual installation. If a Remote Telemetry
Unit (RTU) has multiple master stations, its key
will need to be installed on each master station.
Also, if a master station is compromised, long
term keys are also compromised.
The SCADA Key Management Architecture
(SKMA) proposed in section 5 of this paper has the
following advantages over SKE:
1. SKMA only uses symmetric techniques; thus
simplifying implementation, and minimising
overheads.
2. SKMA only requires that long term keys to be
stored on the node to which the key belongs,
and one other party, the Key Distribution Cen-
ter (KDC). This decreases the number of copies
of each long term key, minimising the risk of ex-
posure, and simplifying recovery from the com-
promise of a master station.
1.2 Contribution
This paper provides a concise description of the con-
straints of a SCADA system with respect to secure
communication (Table 1). Key management require-
ments for SCADA systems are also outlined (Table
2).
The most important contribution of this paper is
the key management mechanism (tailored specifically
for SCADA systems) proposed (Section 5). This con-
tribution consists of the SCADA Key Management
Architecture (SKMA), and the SCADA Key Manage-
ment Protocols (SKMP).
SKMA is an architecture that provides security
meeting the constraints and requirements in Sections
2 and 3. SKMA specifies the keys and mechanisms
required to secure SCADA communications.
SKMP uses a series of existing security techniques
to provide secure key management. ISO 11770-2
mechanism 9 (ISO 1996) is used to establish a long
term key shared between the nodes. An approach for
deriving session keys is suggested, and a technique for
key revocation is described.
2 SCADA Architecture
A SCADA system consists of a number of different
entities communicating with each other. These en-
tities are diverse in purpose and design, varying from
a Remote Telemetry Unit (RTU) that interacts with
the physical environment, to the Human Machine In-
terface (HMI) that operators interact with. In this
paper, the term node will be used to refer to any en-
tity in the system.
The entities that make up a SCADA system are
shown in Figure 1. The boxes with dashed lines in
Figure 1 indicate parts of the system that should be
physically secured. The box at the top left indicates
the main network. The entities in the system, and
the communication channels between entities are de-
scribed in more detail below.
2.1 Remote Telemetry Unit
RTUs are devices composed of a microprocessor that
controls sensors and actuators that interact with the
physical environment.
For example, in a water control system a typical
RTU would consist of:
1. one or more water pumps (actuators);
2. sensors that measure the water level; and
3. a microprocessor that takes input from the water
level sensors, and sends commands to control the
pumps.
RTUs are able to communicate with other entities
in the network. This communication is two-way, with
the RTUs typically allowing settings to be changed
and commands to be sent to the sensors or actuators
of an RTU.
RTUs have limited memory and processing power.
There are RTUs running industry standard protocols
on 16 bit Microprocessors with 8 kilobytes of RAM
(working memory), and 64 kilobytes of EPROM (per-
sistent memory).
An RTU can often be located remotely to the main
corporate offices. The location of RTUs may make
physically securing the units difficult. For example,
sewage pumps need to be located throughout resi-
dential areas, in locations where extensive physical
security is not practical.
2.2 Master Stations
The master station is a node which provides super-
visory control of an RTU. The master station is the
superior in a communication hierarchy (IEEE Stan-
dards Board 1994).
The structure of a SCADA system will normally
include one central master station, which communi-
cates with a hierarchy of other nodes, including sub-
master stations, and RTUs.
Master stations and sub-master stations, are com-
puters with resources at least as plentiful as a modern
desktop computer. These machines typically run on
commodity (standard) hardware and operating sys-
tems.
2.3 Human Machine Interface (HMI)
The HMI is the device that people use to interact with
a SCADA system. HMIs for SCADA systems have
been developed utilising a wide range of client tech-
nologies, including PDAs, web browsers, and Desktop
PCs (IConics 2005).
2.4 Historian
The historian is a database of the historical data from
the SCADA system. It is updated by the master sta-
tion, and can be accessed from the HMI. The Histo-
rian runs on similar hardware to the master station.
2.5 Communication Channels
The network topology of a SCADA system is highly
structured. The available communication paths be-
tween nodes are known in advance. In a SCADA
system there is no need to support ad hoc communi-
cation between nodes. Nodes are added in a managed
fashion. A detailed description of the communication
paths in a SCADA system is outlined below.
2.5.1 Master-RTU Communication
Figure 1 shows many of the diverse options used for
the master-RTU channel. The communication can







As malicious messages on the master-RTU channel
could lead to physical damage, it is critical that this
channel is secured. The physical remoteness of the
RTUs limits the possibility of physical security. A
technical solution, including the use of cryptographic
mechanisms is required. This technical solution will
include a system for managing cryptographic keys.
The mechanisms listed above include a number of
channels where the message travels via wireless sig-
nals. In SCADA systems that use these channels,
messages can be marked for a single node, or can be
sent to all nodes.
2.5.2 RTU-RTU Communication
RTU-RTU communication is possible, and occurs in
a controlled manner. However, not all RTUs will
communicate with other RTUs. There are a num-
ber of scenarios where RTU-RTU communication is
required. These scenarios can all be planned for in
advance. Any security solution designed for master-
RTU communication should also support RTU-RTU
communication. In situations where an RTU is able
to control another RTU, the RTU that acts as a mas-
ter should be physically secured.
Figure 1: SCADA Architecture
2.5.3 Other Communication
Other communication channels include:
HMI-Master Communication: The HMI is able
to communicate with the master station. This
communication is typically run using TCP/IP
based protocols, and utilises a client server ar-
chitecture.
HMI-Historian Communication: The HMI-
Historian communication is similar to that of
the master-HMI channel.
2.6 Key SCADA Architectural Constraints
and Requirements
Table 1 outlines the key elements of the SCADA ar-
chitecture that impact the design of a security ar-
chitecture for SCADA systems. These elements are
referred to as (C1) to (C10) in the remainder of the
paper. The SCADA architecture outlined above does
not match that of popular computer networks. The
differences have an impact on the security require-
ments, therefore a specific solution for SCADA se-
curity is needed. As the HMI-Master architecture
utilises a standard client-server architecture, standard
security solutions can be applied to this part of the
SCADA system.
Of particular note are the requirements relating
to performance. The RTU has low resources, and
many of the communication mechanisms used have
low bandwidth. In addition many of the processes
that are controlled by SCADA systems need to be
monitored and controlled in real time. Most nodes in
the system will only communicate with a small num-
ber of other nodes. Many SCADA systems are always
on, and have been designed to be failproof. The phys-
ical location of a RTU is dictated by the physical envi-
ronment the RTU needs to interact with. This makes
it difficult to apply physical security mechanisms to
the device.
RTUs have a long life time and are designed to last
for at least ten years. Many RTUs have been deployed
for up to twenty-five years. This in combination with
the dispersed physical structure of SCADA systems
means that rolling out changes to the RTUs will take
a long time.
When an RTU is initially added to the network, its
clock should not be trusted, as there will have been
no way of synchronising it with the master station
clock. After the RTU has been installed, it will have
its clock synchronised, in order to support timestamp-
ing of messages.
3 Security Requirements
When looking at the security of a system, the require-
ments can be classified in terms of:
Confidentiality: limiting access to information or
resources to those people.
Integrity: ensuring that the data has not been
changed (data integrity), and the origin has not
be changed (origin integrity or authentication).
This also includes user authentication.
Availability: the ability to use the information or
resource desired. (Bishop 2002)
In a SCADA system, these can be prioritised, with
integrity of messages being the highest concern, fol-
lowed by availability, and then confidentiality. The
rationale for this prioritisation is seen below.
3.1 Integrity
It is critical that messages between nodes are not tam-
pered with, and that no new messages are inserted
(data integrity). A malicious attacker could cause
physical damage if they have the ability to alter or cre-
ate messages. It is also important that the messages
are authenticated, allowing confidence in the source
of messages, and also preventing attackers from in-
serting messages.
User authentication should be performed using
techniques familiar to standard client-server applica-
tions.
ID Constraint/Feature Description
C1 Resource Constrained RTU RTUs have low processing power as well as limited persis-
tent and working memory.
C2 High Resiliency Due to their interaction with the physical world, SCADA
systems have been designed to be always on, without any
downtime. Any change to this should be minimal.
C3 Low Bandwidth and Low
Latency Communications
Bandwidth is limited to 9600 baud on many systems, such
as those that use satellites to communicate with remote
devices
C4 Long Node Life Nodes will typically last for up to 25 years, much longer
than the life spans of typical computer hardware compo-
nents.
C5 Real Time The physical processes controlled by a SCADA system of-
ten need to be interacted with in a real time manner. This
constraint is not constant across all SCADA systems.
C6 Structured Network The structure of the network and its communication chan-
nels will be well defined. Ad hoc communication between
nodes are not required.
C7 Phased Delivery Due to the size of the systems, the real time properties,
and long life span of RTUs, a phased rollout of communi-
cation security is required, perhaps running over a number
of years, while legacy hardware that cannot support the
security is upgraded.
C8 RTUs Physically Insecure As RTUs are deployed to remote locations, they cannot
always be physically secured.
C9 RTU Clocks Initially Unsy-
chronised
When initially installed the clock of an RTU cannot be
relied on.
C10 RTU Clocks Sychronised Af-
ter Initialisation
Once the system has been initialised, the SCADA system
will ensure clocks are synchronised.
Table 1: SCADA system constraints.
3.2 Availability
Many SCADA systems need to be available for use
at all times, as outages can cause physical damage
or threaten human life. Countermeasures designed to
provide improved integrity or confidentiality need to
be implemented in such a way that the availability of
the system is not decreased. The proposed crypto-
graphic solution should not require messages outside
of the initialisation of the system, and dependence on
new messages should be kept to a minimum.
3.3 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is a much lower priority for most
SCADA systems. Support for confidentiality is im-
portant, but will not be used in some environments.
Systems that need to respond instantaneously (C5)
and those that contain resource constrained RTUs
(C1) may not be able to afford the extra process-
ing overheads associated with providing confidential-
ity services.
3.4 Key Establishment Requirements
Having a set of well defined requirements is critically
important for a key establishment system. This facil-
itates thorough analysis of the system, including the
use of provable security techniques.
The key management requirements are outlined
in Table 2. In this table, A and B refer to the en-
tities exchanging keys (master stations and RTUs in
SCADA). The definitions of goals are based on those
given by Boyd & Mathuria (2003).
In listing these requirements, there is some redun-
dancy. Any protocol that provides mutual key au-
thentication will also provide mutual entity authenti-
cation. Similarly, a protocol that provides key confir-
mation will also ensure key integrity.
4 Proposed Architecture for Secure Commu-
nication
The architecture outlined below focuses on key man-
agement for point-to-point communication. The
keys being managed are ones that would be suit-
able for the AGA 12-1 standard (AGA 12-1 Work-
ing Group 2005). Many of the SCADA systems re-
quire broadcast communication. Secure broadcast (as
opposed to point-to-point) message transfer is not
within the scope of this paper. Sending messages over
insecure channels (such as the Internet, and radio) to
a specific node is supported. The µTESLA protocol,
tailored for sensor networks may be a suitable broad-
cast option (Perrig et al. 2002).
Figure 2 depicts a SCADA system, including
an additional entity, the Key Distribution Center
(KDC). Nodes that do not form a part of the new
security architecture are excluded.
4.1 Design Goals
The goals of the security architecture are driven by
the combination of security requirements and the con-
straints inherent in SCADA systems. These factors
combine to form a unique environment, leading to the
design goals outlined below.
As the system has strict performance constraints
(C1, C3 and C5), only symmetric cryptographic tech-
niques will be used. Due to the network structure,
which does not require support for ad-hoc node-to-
node communication (C6), this solution will not pro-
duce the problem of key explosion that is usually
found with symmetric systems.
Figure 2: Key Management Architecture
It is critical that the dependence on nodes such as
the KDC is kept to minimum after the successful de-
ployment of a node in order to maintain the resiliency
of the system (C2). This requirement is met by limit-
ing the dependence on the KDC to the establishment
of a node-node key (see section 5.2), and deriving ses-
sion keys, rather than communicating them.
As the nodes are physically insecure (C8), the se-
curity system needs to ensure that the compromise
of a node has limited impact. Compromising a node
should not compromise all communication.
As a security system cannot be instigated across all
nodes simultaneously (C4 and C7), a node needs to be
able to communicate with other nodes that are know
to be insecure, without using the security system.
4.2 Key Distribution Center
The KDC will be used to maintain a long term key
for each node in the system. The KDC will also con-
tain information regarding the system structure, and
will be responsible for allowing and denying key es-
tablishment requests. In performing this role, it will
be facilitating the distribution of keys, and the ini-
tialisation of trust relationships between nodes. In
addition, key revocation messages will be issued by
the KDC.
The KDC should be co-located with the master
station of the SCADA system, which means that mes-
sages between the KDC and master station will be
efficient. In addition physical security will be high, as
the master station has a requirement of being physi-
cally secured. If possible, the KDC should be imple-
mented using a secure hardware device.
4.3 Trust Relationships
In general RTUs will be deployed into untrusted loca-
tions, which leads to the assumption that the RTUs
are untrusted. The proposed key management system
allows for a node to be compromised without compro-
mising the entire system.
The master station will be trusted by RTUs. In
the case of an environment that includes sub-master
stations, each master station (or sub-master station)
will be trusted by the nodes that are subordinate to
Requirement Description Importance
Mutual Entity Authentication Both entities (A and B) involved
in the protocol will have a fresh
assurance that the other entity
participated in the protocol.
It is critical in establishing the key
that both the master station and
RTU are assured of the existence of
each other.
Key Freshness Both entities are assured that the
key is fresh (i.e. it has just been
created).
Key freshness is required to prevent
adversaries from reusing a revoked
key.
Key Authentication The key is only known by the par-
ties involved in the protocol.
This requirement means that the key
is not known to an adversary.
Mutual Key Confirmation A and B have assurance that the
key has successfully been estab-
lished, and is ready for use.
It is critical that both nodes are as-
sured that the key has been success-
fully communicated, and is available
for use.
Table 2: Proposed Key Establishment Requirements
it. Each master station should be physically secured,
because an attacker would be able to control any of
its children if the master station is compromised.
All nodes will trust the KDC. Each node will have
a key that it shares with the KDC. The trust relation-
ships between a master station and its child RTUs will
be initiated via the KDC.
An RTU may be configured to act as a backup sub-
station to other RTUs. In this case it will be treated
as a sub-master station, with the same requirements
for physical security. The trust relationship between
the backup master RTU, and other RTUs will be ini-
tiated through the KDC.
As communication is performed using wireless sig-
nals (such as radio, WiFi and satellite), the channels
need to be treated as insecure. It is trivial for an
adversary to insert, modify or delete messages from
these channels. The only guarantee the system has is
that messages are delivered some of the time.
4.4 Secure Communication Channels
The architecture proposed will make use of a series
of keys, with different uses. The keys are outlined
below:
long term node-KDC key: This key will be
shared between a node and the KDC, and
will be used when establishing keys used for
communication.
long term node-node key: Nodes that need to
communicate with each other will share a key
that is established using the mechanism in sec-
tion 5.2.
session key: Underlying encryption mechanisms
may or may not recommend the use of a session
key, used for encrypting messages.
broadcast keys: The broadcast mechanism (not
specified in this document), will require indepen-
dent keys.
4.5 Use of Keys
The keys that are generated will be used to commu-
nicate messages. As mentioned in section 4.1, these
messages need to be transmitted efficiently. As dis-
cussed in section 3, all communication requires mes-
sage and source integrity, and where possible confi-
dentiality should be provided.
In environments where confidentiality produces
excessive overheads, a Message Authentication
Code (MAC), using the node-node (or session) key
should be used. Where possible, confidentiality
should be provided. The confidentiality and integrity
services can then be provided using the encrypt and
MAC approach (i.e. encrypt the message and then
produce a MAC), or by using efficient authenticated
encryption modes of operation such as those proposed
by NIST (2003).
5 Proposed Key Management Mechanism
(SKMP)
Each of the keys outlined in section 4.4 will need to
be managed. In order to implement SKMP, processes
for each of the following need to be implemented:
1. Installing the node-KDC key on a node and the
KDC before a node is deployed to the system;
2. Exchanging the node-node key when installing a
new node;
3. Generating a session key that will be used for
more direct communication;
4. As the long term keys will not expire, there needs
to be a mechanism for revoking these keys; and
5. The KDC needs to be able to notify nodes that
a node does not have security deployed, and re-
quires unsecure messages to be sent and received
to it.
5.1 Node-KDC Key
Each node in the proposed system will have a key
which it shares with a key distribution center (KDC).
Both the KDC and the node will need to keep this
key secret.
When adding a new node to the system, a node-
KDC key will be configured and securely stored on
the node and KDC. The key will be installed on the
machines using a manual process.
The node-KDC key will be used to send node-node
key establishment messages between nodes and the
KDC, as described in section 5.2. As this key is only
known by the KDC and the node which the key pro-
tects, the risk of exposure is limited.
5.2 Node-Node Key Establishment
The node-node key establishment protocol will be a
three party key establishment protocol that uses the
KDC as a server. The node-KDC keys will be used
to communicate with the server when running this
protocol. The first documented three party key estab-
lishment protocol was developed in 1978 (Needham
& Schroeder 1978). The Needham-Schroeder proto-
col establishes a key in a series of four messages with
the use of a trusted third party. Unfortunately this
protocol does not meet the requirements specified
in Table 2. The primary failing of the Needham-
Schroeder protocol is that it does not provide key
freshness, allowing adversaries to reuse earlier keys,
using variants of an attack first proposed by Den-
ning & Sacco (1981). Newer protocols based on the
Needham-Schroeder protocol use one of three strate-
gies for ensuring that the keys are fresh.
5.2.1 Time Based Freshness
Protocols have been proposed that include a time-
stamp in the messages sent. An example of a key
establishment protocol that provides these properties
is the Kerberos Authentication Mechanism (Neuman
& Ts’o 1994). It is possible to meet the security re-
quirements of Table 2 using this approach with only
four messages. However synchronised clocks are re-
quired for this to happen.
It is not possible to have synchronised clocks when
the Node-node keys are being established. Since the
key initialisation is performed at the installation of
the RTU, there is no way to ensure that the clocks
are synchronised without sending messages through
the network to confirm. While efficient techniques
for this exist, time synchronisation needs to be per-
formed securely and requires additional communica-
tion, which means that in real terms, more than four
messages need to be sent.
5.2.2 State Based Freshness
Another approach that is not dependent on time de-
pends on the use of a time variant parameter (TVP),
the state of which is maintained by all nodes in the
system. This approach can be implemented without
any dependence on clock synchronisation. Numerous
different techniques using this approach have been
proposed. One approach that minimises the stor-
age requirements on clients and servers is to use the
clock of a trusted server to generate the sequence
number (Mitchell 2000). ISO 11770-2 Mechanism
8 (ISO 1996) depends on a TVP.
In the state based options, nodes are required to
maintain state so that old messages are identified.
This means that nodes will need to maintain two vari-
ables, one which is their long term key, the second be-
ing the state. This is not suitable for the extremely
resource limited SCADA systems.
5.2.3 Nonce Freshness
Instead of depending on time, nonces1 are generated
by the nodes establishing the key. Messages contain-
ing the key material also include the nonce which the
user maintains. The user then confirms the mes-
sage. ISO 11770-2 Mechanism 9 (ISO 1996) uses
nonces, as well as other independently developed pro-
tocols (Carlsen 1994, Bauer, Berson & Feiertag 1983,
Bellare & Rogaway 1995). These protocols all run in
a series of five messages, and meet the requirements
outlined in Table 2.
1A nonce is a number used once.
1. B → A : NB
2. A→ S : NA, NB , B
3. S → A : {NA,KAB , B, Text1}KAS
{NB ,KAB , A, Text2}KBS
4. A→ B : {NB ,KAB , A, Text2}KBS
{N ′A, NB , B, Text3}KAB
5. B → A : {NB , N ′A, T ext4}KAB
Figure 3: ISO 11770-2 Mechanism 9
Figure 3 describes the ISO 11770-2 mechanism 9
protocol.
This figure uses the following conventions:
• NA is a nonce generated by node A.
• N ′A is a second nonce generated by node A.
• S is the server (representing the KDC)
• A and B are nodes that need to establish a key
• A→ B represents a message sent from A to B
• KAB is a key shared by nodes A and B
• {text}KAB is the encryption of the message text,
using the key KAB .
In a SCADA system, nonces are the best way
to ensure freshness. ISO 11770-2 Mechanism 9 is a
protocol that uses nonces to provide freshness. SKMP
utilises this standard protocol, with a minor enhance-
ment.
5.2.4 Modification to 11770-2 Mechanism 9
In the ISO 11770-2 protocol, there are two messages
that are sent between the server and node A. In the
SCADA environment, the master station and KDC
will be co-located, making the master station the
most efficient choice for node A. This means that the
RTU will not need to directly communicate with the
KDC.
In most situations, the master station and KDC
are the parties responsible for initiating the key ini-
tialisation process. In order to do this, an additional
message is sent from the master station or KDC to
the RTU, requesting an initialisation of the protocol.
This would be viewed as message 0, the structure of
which is shown in Figure 4. The node S is the ini-
tiator of the message, and may be either the master
station, or the KDC. Node A is the master station,
and node B is the RTU. After receiving this message,
B will initiate the protocol of Figure 3
0. S′ → B : A,B
Figure 4: Message to initiate 11770-2 Mechanism 9
5.3 Session Key Derivation
In some protocols there is an important requirement
of supporting session-keys. In modern stream ciphers,
this requirement is often avoided through the use of
nonces.
In order to improve the security against cryptan-
alytic attacks, and minimise the consequences of ex-
posure of keys, session keys should be used. In or-
der to minimise the communication overheads, these
keys will be generated using a pseudorandom func-
tion, keyed by the node-node key, and a timestamp
that is based on the duration of the session.
In order to keep the code footprint of this addi-
tional operation low, the MAC function that is used
in the secure communication (or authentication code
when an Authenticated Encryption mode is used) can
be used to create the session key.
As the volume of messages between nodes in a
SCADA system is low (typically less than 1000 a day),
sessions could be set to be a day, keeping the clock-
synchronisation requirements to a minimum. The ses-
sion key derivation will only need to be performed af-
ter the RTU has been deployed to the network. As
clock synchronisation is already performed on most
RTUs to facilitate timestamping of messages, this is
not a new requirement.
5.4 Key Revocation
Key Revocation messages will be initiated by the
KDC, and should be manually initiated whenever a
node or key compromise is detected. There are no
known ways of automatically discovering a key com-
promise. The system should be monitored, and if
there is suspicious behavior, a compromise may have
occurred. The revocation messages should be made
either with a broadcast message or sending specific
messages to nodes. The key being revoked is the
node-node key, which should also cause session keys
to be revoked.
When sending the revocation message to specific
nodes, the message should identify the specific key
being revoked. This prevents adversaries from initi-
ating denial of service attacks against the system by
resending key revocation messages.
The message will be sent encrypted with the node-
KDC key, using a message like that in Figure 5.
In this figure the entities will be:
• A is the entity the key is being revoked from
• S is the KDC
• KAB is the key being revoked.
• KAS is the node-KDC key shared by A and the
KDC.
The message is sent from the KDC to party A,
revoking the key for use between nodes A and B.
1. S → A : {KAB , T ext1}KAS
Figure 5: Key Revocation Message
The structure of a key revocation message sent
using a broadcast message will depend on the security
services offered by the broadcast mechanism used.
5.5 Unsecured Nodes
With the addition of security, master stations will not
allow messages from any RTU, they will only commu-
nicate with nodes that they share a key with. As it
will not be possible for security to be deployed to all
nodes in the system at the same time, the system will
need to support unsecured communications.
In order to do this, the KDC will maintain a list of
nodes which do not have security deployed. As KDC
will also contain details of the network structure, it
will also be able to communicate this information to
the appropriate master stations.
The KDC will tell a secured master station which
unsecured nodes it is able to communicate with. This
list of unsecured nodes needs to be communicated se-
curely, sent in a message from the KDC (S) to Master
station (A) using a message like that in Figure 6. The
messages in Figure 6 will inform A that nodes B and
C are insecure. Included in this message is a TVP to
ensure the freshness of the message.
1. S → A : {B,C,TVP}KAS
Figure 6: Unsecured Node List Message
5.6 Summary of Proposed Mechanism
There are a number of keys that are used in the archi-
tecture, all of which are managed, without violating
the security constraints of Table 1. The features of
the proposed mechanism are outlined here.
Node-KDC Key: This key is manually installed,
and is used to establish node-node keys.
Node-Node Key: A key establishment protocol is
used for this which uses nonces as the clock of the
node will be unsychronised (C9). The protocol
used is based on ISO 11770-2 Mechanism 9. The
structure of the network makes the use of this
protocol feasible with out swamping the system
with key establishment messages (C6).
Session Key: A technique for deriving a session key
from the node key is given. This technique avoids
sending messages (C2, C3) and uses the clocks
which will be sychronised after the system is ini-
tialised (C10).
Key Revocation: A technique for revoking keys
that have been compromised is given. This caters
for the physically insecure nodes which make up
the system (C8).
Unsecured Nodes: The system provides support
for nodes which do not yet have security in-
stalled, in order to support legacy hardware (C4)
and phased delivery of the system (C7).
The security mechanism is implemented without
the use of public key cryptographic techniques due to
the performance constraints of the system (C1, C3,
C5).
6 Sandia Key Management (SKE)
The SKE is described fully in Beaver et al. (2002).
The features of SKE are summarised below, and a
comparison of it with SKMA is made.
6.1 Summary of SKE
SKE sorts communications into different classes.
• Controller-Subordinate communications
• Peer-to-Peer communications
The prime communications strategy proposed in
SKE is for controller-to-subordinate messages. SKE
uses symmetric key techniques for Controller-to-
subordinate communication. SKE uses the following
set of keys:
Long Term Key (LTK): There is a long term key
shared between each controller and subordinate.
This key is manually distributed.
General Seed Key (GSK): This key is stored by
the controller and is used to generate a General
Key. This key is generated by the Cryptographic
Authority (CA).
General Key (GK): The GK is shared by the con-
troller and subordinate. It is generated by the
controller, using the GSK and LTK. It is trans-
mitted from the controller encrypted by the LTK.
Session Key: The session key is generated using the
GK, the senders id, and a TVP.
Peer-to-peer communications are used for commu-
nication between substations (sub-master stations).
The peer-to-peer channels use public key cryptogra-
phy for key exchange messages. The keys required for
peer-to-peer communications are:
Cryptographic Authority Public Key (CAPK):
The CAPK is shared with each substation.
Public Key Signature Key (PKSK): This is a
key shared with all substations, the master sta-
tion and the CA.
Public Private Key Pair: This key pair is created
by the CA, and assigned to each substation.
Common Key: The CK is generated through a key
exchange algorithm.
Session Key: The session key, generated in a sim-
ilar way as for controller-subordinate communi-
cations.
The CK will also have a procedure for revoking cer-
tificates.
SKE forces communications between RTUs to be
performed through a Substation. The substation will
act as a controller, and will receive an encrypted mes-
sage, decrypt it, and then re-encrypt it for the recip-
ient (Beaver et al. 2002).
6.2 Comparison with SKMA
SKMA does not differentiate between master-
controller and peer-to-peer communications in the
same way that SKE does. A consistent approach is
used for all communications, which simplifies the pro-
cess. RTU communications are allowed to be directly
made using the same key management process as for
the rest of the system. Also, direct substation com-
munications are possible without the use of public key
cryptography techniques. SKE requires more work in
installing long-term keys to nodes. In the SKMA sys-
tem, long term keys are only shared by the node and
the KDC. The GSK is not used in SKMA. SKMA
performs a key exchange, but only when adding a
new node to the system. This overhead of five mes-
sages will not impact the performance of the system.
SKMA includes a definition of the key management
requirements which will facilitate a formal security
proof. SKE does not specify the requirements in this
manner.
Table 3 outlines the main differences between the
two systems. The primary differences are:
• SKMA uses a consistent approach for all commu-
nications between nodes, simplifying the imple-
mentation of the protocol;
• the management of long-term keys in SKMA sim-
plifies the process for updating the structure of
the system; and
• constraints on communications allowed are mod-
ified, relaxing limitations on node-node commu-
nication and simplifying the ways in which nodes
are specified.
7 Conclusion
This paper has outlined the requirements for secure
communication for SCADA systems. These require-
ments have been used to develop SKMA, a key man-
agement architecture for SCADA. SKMP, a key man-
agement protocol, was developed to implement the ar-
chitecture. It was shown that the ISO 11770-2 Mech-
anism 9 protocol is suitable for the distribution of
keys, and developed efficient mechanisms for session
key generation, and key revocation. SKMP was com-
pared with SKE (from Sandia), and the advantages
of SKMP over SKE were identified.
In developing this protocol, the following areas of
future related work have been identified:
Secure Broadcast Messages: As SCADA systems
currently use broadcast communications, a suit-
able secure and efficient broadcast mechanism is
required. Such a mechanism will enable nodes to
verify the source of broadcast messages. A key
management solution for the mechanism will also
need to be specified.
Formal Security Proof: The authors are not
aware of a security proof for the 11770-2 Mech-
anism 9 protocol. A security proof for this
protocol should be developed, based on the
Bellare & Rogaway (1995) protocol which is
closely related to 11770-2 Mechanism 9.
Efficient Algorithms: The most appropriate
secure and efficient algorithms that provide con-
fidentiality and integrity need to be identified.
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